From left, Veena Merchant, editor-in-chief of News India-Times and Capitol Debates’ Host; Meera Kamdar and Maya Chadda. (Photo: Courtesy, TV Asia)

Recent publication by Strobe Talbott, the former deputy secretary of state during Clinton administration, ‘Engaging India’ –– you must have read it line-by-line, I haven’t, I must confess. But he makes some interesting comments, about U.S.-India relations. He starts with saying, “The relationship was jinxed. India was a target of American ideological and geopolitical antagonism....The affinity might have existed which otherwise was victim of incompatible obsessions: India’s with Pakistan and America’s with the Soviet Union. One reason that the United States and India were so at odds for so long was that each was on such good terms with the other’s principal enemy.”

VEENA MERCHANT: Can you put a little bit of a historical perspective to this? Were they as jinxed as he says?

MAYA CHADDA: Well indeed, until recently, that is, I’m talking about the end of the Cold War, relations were guided by United States’ obsession with the Soviet Union as Talbott says and the U.S. was very upset with India’s not taking positions that would be favorable to the U.S. on a number of issues. Not being sufficiently anti Soviet. Also, Pakistan has always been a favorite in this part of the world because they could make the defense agreements. They had mutual defense agreements with Pakistan.

MERCHANT: Meera, how did this relationship start? How did India turn pro Soviet? Where did it start?

MEERA KAMDAR: India, from the get-go, wanted to maintain its independence. It had its own interests and saw that it had its own role to play and will, as the founder of the Nonalignment Movement. India I think felt more and more alienated from the United States which even in those days had a ‘either you are with us or against us’ kind of approach to international relations, India increasingly turned toward Soviet Union for military assistance.

MERCHANT: The Indian Americans see India as the largest democracy. In terms of numbers, we should be more visible here. Are we more visible here?

CHADDA: Now things have changed enormously.

MERCHANT: Talking about now, Powell is leaving definitely and Condoleezza Rice is going to take over. How much of a difference is that going to make? Any one of you can take the question.

KAMDAR: I think that Secretary Powell did create a little bit of hurt and exasperation in India when he visited India this year and then went directly after to Pakistan and made the announcement that Pakistan is non-NATO ally which was a big shock to the Indian leadership.

CHADDA: I’d like to take a slightly different angle. I agree with what Meera is saying, but I think it is important to keep in mind that it was actually Powell –– as the Indian leaders have seen it –– who was not so enthusiastic about India because he felt much more close to Musharraf because he was from military background –– that was one angle. But the other is, the neoconservatives in Washington, have a different perspective on India from others.

MERCHANT: I would love to know what is the neoconservatives’ perspective on India?

The new conservative perspective is that, they see India and Israel as key countries –– the Islamic crescent that runs across all the way from the Middle East to Malaysia. They see them as strategic partners. And so far as Rice is concerned –– she is becoming the secretary general –– she is much more likely to bring this neo kind of perspective implemented.

MERCHANT: Maya let’s switch to the nuclear issue. Can you once again give a little historical perspective on this issue?

CHADDA: The nuclear test in 1998 first for India and then for Pakistan set back the relationship with the United States.

MERCHANT: According to Talbott, Clinton was always interested in India but he took so long to take his first trip because of the nuclear issue. Do you agree with that?

CHADDA: Yes, but I think it’s more than that. The United States President has visited many countries that have ammunitions.

MERCHANT: Jaswant Singh met with Talbott many times. Do you think this had any effect on creating this environment of happy relations between these two countries?

KAMDAR: They met scores and scores of times and became good friends and that had a definite, positive impact on the relationship. But I agree with my esteemed colleague Maya that the fact that India has the bomb now, is absolutely essential and U.S. must recognize that. But more than that, India has conducted itself as a responsible possessor of the bomb. It’s been responsible in the region, responsible on the global stage.

The United States looks to India as a strategic partner. One thing the Bush administration forgot though in its foreign policy doctrine laid out early in the administration was to recognize India as an emerging power and as a regional power was a complete break from the way India was spoken about even at the rhetorical level in U.S. foreign policy up until that time and as an important regional power. Rice was one of the architects on that –– and I think she would carry on that attitude of seeing India as a partner –– not exactly as a superpower but as a partner.

MERCHANT: Maya, shall we now talk about Kashmir. That has also been an issue between the two countries. Maya, once again I’m going to put you in a position to give us a little bit of history on U.S.-India relations vis-à-vis Kashmir.

CHADDA: Kashmir has been the central issue in India-Pakistan relations and given the United States’ involvement in Pakistan –– the United States has always been involved in Pakistan on this issue. U.S. position has been that you must consult on this issue with Kashmiris. They must have some kind of a voice on how their fate’s being determined.

MERCHANT: What do you think we want now? We’ve been a little bit like a coy bride . We want U.S. to take a part in this whole situation or we don’t want any interference at all?

CHADDA: Since the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) there has been some kind of a willingness on part of India to let the United States in becoming a behind-the-scene broker to put pressure on Pakistan because the United States has a great deal of clout on Pakistan.

MERCHANT: Meera, do you like the idea of the U.S. being a part of the negotiation?

KAMDAR: I think if any resolution in this conflict can be arrived at, I don’t mind who is involved.

I think it is important for India’s prestige and its participation for that behind-the-scene. I don’t think either India or Pakistan would want the United States to be seen as a puppeteer or anbroker.

MERCHANT: It’s such an emotional issue even with the Indian Americans here. Do you think it is ever going to be solved? What’s your gut feeling?

CHADDA: We don’t know, last 50 years don’t give us much hope in that direction. I think if there ever was a time, this would be it. I do believe that there is a reassessment in Pakistan. At least among the ruling elite in Pakistan, they begin to see where the world is going and they know that the United States will drop them when the war on terrorism moves on to a different arena. So they have to therefore position themselves in a way that they can then become –– their idea is to become the conduit in the region –– Central Asia and the Gulf.

And for that they have to have a friendly relationship with India. And their economy is just beginning to recover. Its posting 6 percent growth and they are predicting more, so they are beginning to see it in that light.

MERCHANT: Both of you must have seen the headlines about the U.N. Security Council’s repositioning, the report by the United Nations. Do you think with this repositioned relationship between the U.S. and India, can India ever be viewed as one of the permanent members?

KAMDAR: India will become one of the permanent members.

MERCHANT: But do you think the U.S. will back India?

KAMDAR: The United States will back India but I think it will back it the way it has been proposed, that is as a non-veto voting member so that it keeps a great deal of power in the hands of original five members; it allows the expansion of the council to accommodate a very changed world and to put India, Brazil, Germany, Japan –– these are the major countries that have been discussed for sometime as candidates. But these countries will not have veto power. That is an important decision. So to that extent the U.S. will back it.

MERCHANT: But how much extra power does India gain from that positioning, in case it does?

CHADDA: It’s the first step. The next round of U.N. reforms might see a different world.

(Transcribed by Gloria Suhasini)